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ABSTRACT 
Although it is well known that sleep loss results in poor judgement and decisions, little is 
known about the influence of social context in these processes. Sixteen healthy young 
adults underwent three games involving bargaining (‘Ultimatum’ and ‘Dictator’) and 
trust, following total sleep deprivation (TSD) and during rested wakefulness (RW), in a 
repeated-measures, counterbalanced design. To control for repeatability, a second 
group (n = 16) was tested twice under RW conditions. Paired anonymously with another 
individual, participants made their simple social interaction decisions facing real 
monetary incentives. For bargaining, following TSD participants were more likely to 
reject unequal-split offers made by their partner, despite the rejection resulting in a zero 
monetary payoff for both participants. For the trust game, participants were less likely to 
place full trust in their anonymous partner. Overall, we provide novel evidence that 
following TSD, the conflict between personal financial gain and payoff equality is 
focused upon avoidance of unfavourable inequality (i.e. unfairness). This results in the 
rejection of unfair offers at personal monetary cost, and the lack of full trust which would 
expose one to being exploited in the interaction. As such, we suggest that within a 
social domain decisions may be more influenced by emotion following TSD, which has 
fundamental consequences for real-world decision-making involving social exchange. 
 
 
ARTICLE 
Introduction 
It is well established that sleep deprivation (SD) is associated with decrements in basic 
cognitive function, such as alertness, vigilance and sustained attention (Dorrian et al., 
2005; Lim and Dinges, 2008; Van Dongen et al., 2003). What is less well known is the 
impact of SD on higher-level cognitive functions (Killgore et al., 2006), referred to 
collectively as the ‘executive functions’. Research findings of total sleep deprivation 
(TSD) have revealed more understanding of links between TSD and aspects of 
prefrontal function (executive function), such as planning (Horne, 1988), working 
memory (Chee and Chuah, 2008; Turner et al., 2007), inhibition (Harrison and Horne, 
1998), generation of speech (Harrison and Horne, 1997, 1998) and novel goal-directed 
behaviour (Horne, 1993). Given the vulnerability of these functions to TSD, it is 
understandable that TSD affects the ability to make decisions per se (Harrison and 
Horne, 2000; Killgore et al., 2006; McKenna et al., 2007), as effective decision-making 
relies on the ability to appreciate future events (planning), update strategies (working 
memory), avoid distractions/irrelevant information (inhibition), think laterally and 
innovatively (novel, goal-directed behaviour) and to communicate effectively (generation 
of speech) (c.f. Harrison and Horne, 2000). While error in any of these TSD vulnerable 
behaviours may cause a poor decision judgement, what is lacking in our understanding 
of TSD and decision-making, and fundamental to the decision-making process in the 
real world, is the influence of our social environment. 
Much of our current understanding of TSD effects on decision-making results from 
different aspects of individual decision-making (e.g. Harrison and Horne, 2000; Killgore 
et al., 2006). However, many important occupations rely on people working together 
cooperatively for extended periods and under conditions of sleep loss (e.g. emergency 
services, military personnel, trade union leaders). While some research has looked at 
the impact of TSD on decision-making in team versus individual performance (Baranski 
et al., 2007), to our knowledge, there remains an important gap in the literature 
describing TSD effects in interactive environments, especially those involving social 
preference domains. In behavioural economics, ‘social preference’ refers to how people 
rank different allocations of material payoffs to themselves and others (Fehr and 
Camerer, 2007). Environments of basic social interaction, such as those involving 
simple bargaining behaviour or trust decisions between two or more people, have yet to 
be explored in the wealth of TSD research. However, such environments form the 
building blocks of many more complicated real-world decision environments that hold 
particular interest because of their pitting of rational versus emotional response 
mechanisms in weighing decision costs and benefits. 
The ability to regulate emotions is integral to any decision-making process, and given 
that most real-world decisions are not made individually, emotional response 
mechanisms may play a greater role in social dilemmas of various sorts. A recent study 
involving subject viewings of aversive pictures showed a weakened functional 
connectivity between the amygdala and the medial prefrontal cortex (PFC) following 35 
h of TSD (Yoo et al., 2007). Thus, existing research suggests an important hypothesis 
for how TSD might affect decisions involving more emotion-based domains, such as 
social interaction environments. Specifically, the mediation of emotion-based responses 
(by the PFC) may be weakened, which would lead to more irrational decision-making 
(i.e. ruled by emotion) than would otherwise occur. Although decisions will not 
automatically be worse if more emotion-based, as the quality of the decision outcome 
will depend on the context of the decision, there may be an important shift in the engine 
driving social dilemma decisions following TSD. 
A large body of literature surrounds three often-studied social preference environments 
in experimental and behavioural economics: the ‘Ultimatum’, ‘Dictator’ and ‘Trust’ 
games. Simple bargaining is examined with the classic Ultimatum game introduced by 
Guth et al. (1982). In this game, two players are given a pie of $X to divide. The player 
assigned as the proposer suggests a division of the pie to the other player (the 
responder). If the responder accepts the proposed division, then the pie is divided in the 
proposed way to yield the players’ payoffs in the game. However, should the responder 
reject the proposal, both players earn zero. The game is over after the responder’s 
accept/reject decision. While simplistic, the game captures the important tension 
between selfish behaviour versus fairness or other-regarding behaviour. A variation of 
the game, called the ‘Dictator’ game (Forsythe et al., 1994), removes the option of 
rejection by the responder. This additional simplification was examined to help 
distinguish the extent to which proposals in the Ultimatum game were really driven by 
fairness consideration rather than a simple fear of rejection. Average offers in $10.00 
Ultimatum games are approximately $4.00, with offers lower than $2.50 often being 
rejected (see summary in Holt, 2007). Dictator offers are typically lower (average of 
$2.33 in Forsythe et al., 1994), although average Dictator offers still average above zero 
(modal offer is typically zero, however); thus strategic considerations seem to play a 
role in these simple bargaining environments. 
The Trust game (Berg et al., 1995) allows an examination of trust and trustworthiness in 
an environment that is not zero sum (i.e. zero sum being where one player’s gain is 
necessarily the other’s loss), as are the Ultimatum and Dictator games. In this game, 
the first mover decides how much of an initial sum, for instance $10.00, to pass to the 
second mover. Whatever amount is passed is then tripled by the experimenter, and the 
second mover may then decide how much, if any, of the tripled amount to return to the 
first mover. Thus, the first mover’s ‘pass’ decision can be regarded as a measure of 
trust, whereas the second mover’s pass decision is a measure of trustworthiness. 
[Although more recent research has highlighted the fact that first movers in the Trust 
game may pass money out of altruism as well as trust, this recent evidence still 
indicates that trust is a probable component of the first-mover decisions in this game 
(see Cox, 2004).] In Berg et al. (1995), the average amount passed was $5.16, and 
after tripling, about $2.79 (18% of the tripled amount) was returned. An important 
difference in the Trust game is the risk the first mover takes in deciding to pass money. 
Fear of betrayal or being taken advantage of may be aroused in making the trust 
decision in a way that is magnified over the fear of rejection in the Ultimatum game. 
While no study currently exists that assesses TSD in relation to these social preference 
games, clues from neurological evidence suggest that TSD may modify behaviour 
choices. In a pioneering imaging study assessing the neural basis of the Ultimatum 
game, Sanfey and colleagues demonstrated that unfair offers elicit anterior insula and 
dorsolateral activation (Sanfey et al., 2003), the former region being linked to specific 
negative states, such as anger or disgust (Damasio et al., 2000), and the latter in the 
control of cognitive processes (i.e. Miller and Cohen, 2001; Wagner et al., 2001). 
Moreover, in Sanfey et al.’s (2003) study, while rejected unfair offers activated the 
anterior insula, acceptance of unfair offers exhibited greater dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (DLPFC) activation, which may signify an induced ‘conflict in the responder 
between cognitive (‘accept’) and emotional (‘reject’) motives’ (Sanfey et al., 2003, pg;. 
1757) following an unfair proposal. Given the disruption of the PFC during sleep loss, 
we hypothesize that TSD will alter the rejection of offers perceived as unfair. While this 
has yet to be examined with disruption to the PFC because of sleep loss, Koenigs and 
Tranel (2007) examined subjects with ventromedial PFC lesions, and reported that 
simple bargaining offers were rejected more frequently by these subjects. As such, 
these subjects sacrificed monetary gain to reject unfair treatment. The extent to which 
this may be mirrored in subjects following 36-h TSD is unknown, and forms the basis of 
our study. 
 
Methodology 
 
Participants 
Thirty-two young healthy participants (16 males, 16 females, aged 20.2–24.1 years) 
who were good sleepers [determined via actiwatch (Cambridge Neurotechnology Ltd, 
Cambridge, UK) and sleep diaries] and with no complaint of daytime sleepiness 
(Epworth Sleepiness Scale ≤ 10; Johns, 1991) were recruited following interviews and 
subsequent screening to exclude those who smoked and had an average intake of 
alcohol more than 4 U day−1 [1 U = 10 mL of ethanol. For any given drink, unit = volume 
(mL) × % alcohol by volume (ABV)/1000, i.e. A 250-mL glass of wine (14%) = 3.5 U] 
and/or caffeine more than 300 mg day−1; had any sleep or medical problems (other than 
minor illnesses); or were on any medication liable to cause daytime sleepiness. In 
addition, those who took daytime naps more than twice per month were excluded from 
the study. To check for stable sleep patterns actiwatches (Cambridge Neurotechnology) 
were worn for an initial screening week. Those who slept 8 ± 1 h per night, and with 
consistent bed/rise times, were included in the study. The study was approved by 
Loughborough University’s Ethical Advisory Committee. All procedures were explained 
fully, informed consent given and participants were paid for their involvement. 
Participants were assigned randomly to either the experimental group (n = 16, eight 
males; eight females; average age 22.6 ± 1.2 years) or control group (n = 16, eight 
males; eight females; average age 22.3 ± 2.1 years). Using a repeated-measures 
design, the experimental group underwent three social preference tasks twice, once 
following 36 h of TSD and another following normal sleep (rested wakefulness: RW). 
While these were counterbalanced, we repeated the tests twice with the control group 
as a check on consistency. Groups were matched for age, sex, IQ, anxiety and 
personality. 
 
Design and Procedure 
In a repeated-measures design, the experimental group arose at 08:00 h, following a 
night of ‘normal’ sleep at home, as determined by actiwatch (Cambridge 
Neurotechnology) and timed telephone calls to the laboratory. For both conditions, 
participants arrived at the laboratory at 14:00 h (actigraphy verified non-napping), where 
actiwatches were checked for compliance and questionnaires completed. For the RW 
condition, they were given a small meal at 16:00 h and began testing at 19:00 h on (see 
below). For the TSD condition, they were kept under constant supervision for a further 
25 h to ensure that they remained awake, adhered to study protocol and for reasons of 
safety. They began testing at 19:00 h on day 2 following 35–36 h TSD. 
 
During TSD, participants consumed only non-caffeinated drinks and were given food 
opportunities at 3-h intervals, where they ate ad libitum. Foods with high sugar content 
were omitted, because of bolus amounts of sugar having an initial alerting effect 
followed by a sleepiness rebound (Anderson and Horne, 2006). During the 25-h 
laboratory period, they engaged in conversation, light reading, watched TV or played 
board games. At the end of the trial, they were escorted home and consented to 
undertake recovery sleep before driving, riding a bicycle or operating machinery. 
 
Conditions were counterbalanced, so eight subjects underwent TSD followed by RW 
and eight subjects underwent RW followed by TSD. Each session was separated by 1 
week to allow for adequate recovery sleep. Control participants were tested twice under 
the same protocol as the experimental RW condition and, again, each test session was 
separated by 1 week. 
 
Test Sessions 
Four participants made up each test trial. Each participant was paired randomly with 
one other participant in a single-blind manner (i.e. paired anonymously). They were 
given the following standard information: ‘We have matched you with another member 
of the group and between you, you will play a series of short, simple games. You should 
be aware that any financial payoff from the game is real and so you should make your 
decisions carefully’. 
Each game required a first mover and a second mover. We employed a particular 
procedure known as the ‘strategy’ method to elicit a maximum amount of data from the 
subjects. Using this method in the Ultimatum and Trust games, the second responder 
enters a response for any possible contingency of money passed from the first mover 
(as opposed to just responding to one particular first-mover decision). Additionally, 
subjects are asked to make decisions for both the first-mover and second-mover 
subject-roles in the Ultimatum and Trust games (as well as a first-mover decision in the 
Dictator game). Ex poste role assignment was random and, after all decisions were 
made, was used to calculate payoffs. This method places subjects in a position to think 
through the social dilemma from both players’ perspectives, realizing that there is an 
equal chance that they may be assigned to either role; their randomly assigned role 
may vary for each test. Finally, after role assignments were made, subjects were paired 
up (one first mover assigned to one second mover) randomly and anonymously, such 
that subjects were never aware of with whom they were paired for the decision 
experiments. This way of eliciting decisions does not alter play in the Ultimatum game 
(cf. Oxoby and McLeish, 2004). 
Anonymity is accomplished by recruiting subjects in groups of four. Thus, while subjects 
were aware that they were matched randomly with one of the other subjects in their 
group, the identity of the pairings was never revealed. A key feature in this design is that 
subjects were keenly aware that their decisions were not hypothetical, and that a real 
bargaining and trust payoff would be received based on the decisions made in the 
random and anonymous role assignments and pairings. Thus, subjects stood to gain or 
lose real money based on their own and their anonymous counterpart’s decisions, 
which enhanced the validity of their decisions. 
There were three games in total and these were counterbalanced to avoid order effects. 
Each test was approximately 5 min in duration, and there was a 5-min gap between 
tests. Total test duration was less than 30 min. 
 
Bargaining games: Ultimatum and Dictator 
The Ultimatum game (see Fig. 1) (Guth et al., 1982) has been used extensively in 
experimental and behavioural economics research (see references in Holt, 2007), as 
well as in the nascent field of neuroeconomics (e.g. Koenigs and Tranel, 2007; Sanfeyet 
al., 2003). In this game, two players were allocated £5. The proposer proposed how to 
split this money and the responder chose whether to accept or reject the offer. If the 
offer is rejected, both players earn zero. The purely self-interested rationale, therefore, 
is for the proposer to offer the smallest amount possible for the responder to accept. 
The most frequent offer is approximately 40–50% of the sum, and about half the 
responders reject offers below 30% (Nowak et al., 2000). This would suggest that 
humans consider fairness in their decisions. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  A graphical depiction of the Ultimatum and Dictator games. In the Ultimatum game, the first 
mover proposes any division of the £5.00 in 50-p increments. For simplicity, we show only a ‘fair’ and 
‘unfair’ proposal branches above, where any offer of less than half the pie is probably considered unfair, 
to some degree. The second mover then chooses to accept or reject the proposal, with rejection implying 
a zero payoff for both players. The Dictator game is the same as the Ultimatum game, except that the 
second mover has no option to reject. Using the strategy method, the second mover was required to 
make an accept/reject decision for all possible proposals (£0.50, £1.00, £1.50, etc.) for the Ultimatum 
game. 
 
In cubicle 1, the ‘proposer’ was given the following instruction: ‘We have matched you 
with another member of the group and between you, you will play a short, simple game. 
There is £5 and you as first mover must decide how much of the £5 (in 50-p increments) 
you want to pass to your partner or keep. However, we must warn you that your partner 
has the choice to accept your offer or reject it. If they reject it, you will both receive 
nothing’. Once the participant understood, they made their offer and posted it on the 
offer card and handed this to the experimenter in a sealed envelope. 
The experimenter went to cubicle 2 (to second mover) and gave the following 
instruction: ‘You are the second mover and your partner has made their first move as to 
how much of the £5 they have chosen to give you. However, we cannot tell you the 
amount they have proposed but ask you to make a decision for each eventuality. Again, 
it is important you answer honestly, as this could be real money’. The participant was 
given a recording sheet of every eventuality (50 p, £1, £1.50 and so on) and was told: 
‘In front of you is the response sheet for you to record your decision. You can see the 
amount your partner has kept for themselves and how much they choose to give you. 
Please indicate whether you wish to accept or reject this offer. Remember, if you reject 
you both receive nothing’. The responder gave their decisions to the experimenter in a 
sealed envelope. 
By not revealing the actual amount given, we were able to assess response for each 
eventuality for data analysis purposes. Importantly, this game was then repeated but 
with the roles reversed, so each participant played both the proposer (first mover) and 
the responder (second mover). 
The ‘Dictator’ game (see Fig. 1) is much the same as before, the main difference being 
that the responder must accept any offer. Previous research suggests that offers made 
by the proposer are much lower than the Ultimatum game (although still above zero) 
(Forsythe et al., 1994), suggesting that the 40–50% offer in the Ultimatum game is due 
to both an element of fairness as well as a fear of rejection (loss). 
For the Dictator game, the proposer was given the following instruction: ‘You have 
another £5 which you can split with your partner in whichever way you choose in 
increments of 50 p. However, this time they have no choice whether to accept or reject 
and so you can give them what you like. However, do remember this is real money and 
will be a decision used to calculate both your earnings. Please make your decision 
now’. 
 
Trust Game 
Here, the first mover receives £5 and then decides whether to invest in a trustee 
(second mover) or not. Any money invested and passed to the second mover is tripled, 
and the second mover then decides how much to retain or pass back to the first mover 
(see Fig. 2). 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  A graphical depiction of the Trust game. The first mover has the choice to split £5.00 between 
himself and player 2. Anything he/she choose to pass will be tripled. The second mover then has the 
option of giving some money back to the first mover. The amount passed by the first mover y, is a 
measure of TRUST (the extent of trust proxied by how much he/she chooses to pass). The amount, x, the 
second mover returns is an indication of trustworthiness. Using the strategy method, the second mover is 
required to make a decision for all outcomes (£0.50, £1.00, £1.50,…, £15.00). 
 
The first mover was given the following instruction: ‘We have matched you with another 
member of the group and between you, you will play a short, simple game. There is £5 
and as first mover you must decide how much of the £5 (in 50-p increments) you want 
to pass or keep. Whatever you choose to pass will be multiplied by 3 and given to your 
partner. Your partner will then have a choice of how much to pass back to you. 
Remember to answer honestly as you and your partner could receive this amount. 
Please indicate how much you would like to pass or keep’. The first mover recorded 
their response and placed in a sealed envelope. 
 
The second mover (in cubicle 2) was then given the following instruction: ‘You are the 
second mover. Your partner has opted to give you a certain portion of their £5 and we 
have multiplied that by 3. However, we cannot tell you the amount they have proposed 
but ask you to make a decision for each eventuality. Again, it is important you answer 
honestly, as this could be real money. Please indicate for each amount how much (if 
any) you would like to give back to your partner. Again, remember this is real money 
and may count towards your final payoff’. The second mover made their decisions and 
placed them in a sealed envelope. 
 
Roles were then reversed, so each participant made a first-mover and second-mover 
decision. In both simple bargaining and trust, it was explained clearly to the subjects 
that roles would be assigned randomly after all decisions were made, and each subject 
would earn the payoff associated with their decision matched with that of their randomly 
assigned counterpart. 
 
Overview of test variables 
In the bargaining games, for each subject we have three test variables: (1) an 
Ultimatum proposer decision (i.e. a proposal); (2) an Ultimatum responder decision 
coded as a minimum acceptable offer (MAO) from the subjects’ menu of accept/reject 
decisions made ex ante for all possible proposal contingencies and (3) a Dictator 
proposal. For the Trust game, each subject makes a first-mover (trust) decision, as well 
as a second-mover (trustworthiness) decision for every possible first-mover choice. 
 
Data analysis 
Given our repeated-measures design, with counterbalanced ordering of TSD and RW 
conditions, we analyze the data as matched pairs. This allows us to examine causal 
changes in subject choice as a result TSD. Given the relatively small sample size and 
possible non-normality of the data, in most instances we employ non-parametric 
statistical methods. Our analysis assumes that decisions across experiments are 
independent, and adjustments are made for ties in the matched-pairs data (i.e. when a 
subject’s decision is identical in the TSD and RW conditions). 
 
While our counterbalancing of the condition order in our sleep group helps to remove 
any ordering effects in the matched-pairs data, as noted earlier we also administered 
the experiment to a group of 16 control subjects. Thus, the control subject data allow us 
to examine the pure effect of repeat administration or learning in the data. As will be 
seen, control subject decisions were never significantly different across the two 
administrations of the tasks. 
 
For examining our TSD hypotheses from our repeated-measures design, we report 
results from the sign test on the bivariate random sample of each pair of decisions 
made by a subject (unless noted otherwise). This non-parametric test places no 
assumption of normality on the distribution of the sample data, although it does assume 
that the data across subjects are independent. In most cases, we reject the null 
hypothesis of normality of the relevant matched-pairs data distribution for our various 
tests (Shapiro–Wilk test, P < 0.10), and so do not utilize the (parametric) matched-pairs 
t-test. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test is another potentially more powerful non-
parametric test that could be used on matched-pairs data. However, the Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test places the additional assumption of symmetry on the data. Given that 
our matched-pairs data violate this assumption (as confirmed by symmetry plots), we 
analyze our matched-pairs data with the more simple but appropriate sign test. 
 
Results 
Ultimatum and Dictator Results 
As seen in Fig. 3, first-mover proposals from the Ultimatum and Dictator games reveal 
that Dictator offers were significantly lower than Ultimatum offers (P ≤ 0.01). This was 
also evident in the control group (P = 0.05). However, treating each subject’s pair of 
Ultimatum offers as matched-pairs data, we conclude that ultimatum offers are not 
affected by the sleep condition (RW versus TSD, P > 0.10) or repeat administration for 
the control group (P > 0.10). 
 
 
Figure 3.  Average proposal decisions on the Ultimatum (black bars) and Dictator (white bars) games. 
Standard error bars are shown. All proposals were reduced on the Dictator game. †P < 0.01. There was 
no main effect of total sleep deprivation (TSD) on either decision. RW, rested wakefulness. 
 
Figs 4 and 5 show the summarized data on the Ultimatum game responder decisions. 
From these data, we calculate MAO for each subject for each condition (sleep group) or 
administration (control group). Mean and standard deviation for MAO for the sleep 
condition are £0.84 ± 0.85 for well-rested subjects and £1.34 ± 1.09 following 36-h TSD. 
For control subjects, MAO is £1.22 ± 0.88 and £1.28 ± 0.97 on first and second 
administrations of the task, respectively. Figs 4 and 5 also highlight the 50 : 50 equal-
split outcome at £2.50, which is an offer rarely rejected in the Ultimatum game. 
Examining the matched-pairs data of MAO from each subject, we find that the 
difference in MAO was not significant across administrations in the control treatment (P 
> 0.10); see Fig. 4. However, we find that MAOs are significantly higher following TSD 
than in the RW condition of our sleep group (P = 0.05); see Fig. 5. Thus, we conclude 
that 36 h of TSD leads subjects to bargain more aggressively in this simple Ultimatum 
game, although the effect manifests itself only in responder decisions and not in first-
mover proposals. 
 
Figure 4.  Cumulative frequency of participants accepting the proposer offer for the control group. The 
dotted vertical line marks the 50 : 50 equal split of the pie, which is normally accepted in this game. There 
were no differences in the matched-pairs control. NB: where only one line is evident, the dotted line runs 
parallel with the black line. 
 
 
Figure 5.  Cumulative frequency of participant accepting the proposer offer for the experimental group 
[total sleep deprivation (TSD) versus rested wakefulness (RW)]. The dotted vertical line marks the 50 : 50 
equal portion size, which is normally accepted in this game. There was a significant effect of TSD (P < 
0.05) on the minimum acceptable offer (MAO). NB: where only one line is evident, the dotted line runs 
parallel with the black line. 
 
Trust game results 
Fig. 6 highlights the results for TSD versus RW in the trust game. Here, data indicate 
that well-rested subjects may keep less and pass more (i.e. trust more) than TSD 
subjects. The main amount kept following TSD is £2.06 ± 1.59 SD compared with £1.41 
± 1.49 for RW (see Fig. 4). For the first and second administrations of the task for the 
control group, mean amounts kept were £2.25 ± 1.03 and £2.53 ± 1.31, respectively. 
Sign-test analysis of the matched-pairs data did not reveal any statistically significant 
differences, either across sleep conditions or control group administrations (P > 0.10). 
 
 
Figure 6.  Average amount passed and kept by the first mover in the Trust game. Black bars refer to 
money kept, white bars to money given. While it appears that the subjects in the rested wakefulness (RW) 
group pass (trust) more, this falls below the acceptable level of significance. Standard error bars are 
shown. TSD, total sleep deprivation. 
 
Upon further examination of first-mover trust decisions, Fig. 7 highlights that although 
sleep condition may not affect average trust levels, the difference in sleep conditions 
may be largest at the extreme trust end of the distribution. If we define extreme trust 
arbitrarily as those instances when the first mover passed at least £4.00 of the possible 
£5.00 (80% of possible trust amount), then we find that 5 of 16 subjects exhibit extreme 
trust amount during TSD, compared with 9 of 16 subjects when well-rested. Defining 
extreme trust as occurring in either subject condition with probability P, we then use the 
binomial test to examine the differences in probability of extreme trust in the TSD and 
RW sleep conditions. A baseline P could be generated from the control subject data, but 
such data may have group-specific effects, so we proceed by utilizing the experimental 
group’s RW Prw = 0.5625 (9 of 16) as the hypothesized probability of extreme trust for 
the binomial tests. In so doing, we reject the null hypothesis that the TSD subjects have 
a similar probability of extreme trust against the one-sided alternative that their 
probability Ptsd < Prw (P-value of 0.04 for the one-sided binomial test). Had we chosen 
Ptsd = 0.3125 (5 of 16) as the hypothesized probability of extreme trust, we reject the 
null hypothesis that Ptsd = Prw in favour of one-sided alternative that Ptsd < Prw (P-
value = 0.01 in this instance). Thus, there is evidence consistent with the hypothesis 
that subjects trust less following TSD, although the effect is concentrated at the extreme 
trust end of the continuum of trust possibilities. 
 
 
Figure 7.  Cumulative distribution function (CDF) of amount kept by first mover in the Trust game. 
Sixteen subjects (vertical axis) from the experimental group make up the entirety of the CDF. The larger 
difference between the total sleep deprivation (TSD) and rested wakefulness (RW) distributions at lesser 
amounts kept indicates that the highest trust levels occur among significantly fewer TSD subjects 
compared with RW. 
 
For second-mover decisions, while some group difference exist in the RW versus TSD 
group, the effects of sleep condition or repeat administration do not affect a subject’s 
trustworthiness significantly (Kolmogorov–Smirnov full distribution test, P > 0.10). 
Interestingly, while the significant result in the bargaining experiments was localized to 
second-mover (responder) decisions in the Ultimatum game, in the Trust game the 
interesting result is with respect to first-mover (trust) decisions. We examine this in more 
detail in ‘Discussion’ section. 
 
Discussion 
Our results highlight the important effects of SD on simple two-person social 
interactions that may be relevant in a real-world setting. Across two related social 
preference environments, we find that individuals interact more aggressively following 
TSD. As responders in the Ultimatum game, subjects increased their MAOs following 
TSD, perhaps indicating an increased resistance to offers perceived as unfair. In the 
simple trust environment, although the evidence is not uniform across all trust levels, we 
find that extreme levels of trust among first movers in the trust experiment are less likely 
following TSD. It is noteworthy that trusting one’s counterpart by passing along money 
in this environment puts one at risk to being taken advantage of. 
 
Recent advances in behavioural economics research suggest that the issue of equality 
may be an important factor in these decisions. Fehr and Schmidt (1999), for example, 
introduce a theory that models how people care about payoff inequity (i.e. fairness) in 
social interactions, and not just their own payoff. Thus, any deviation from equal payoffs 
is assumed to lower one’s value or utility function over outcomes. Other theories 
introduce notions of fairness into individual preference functions (e.g. Bolton and 
Ockenfels, 2000; Rabin, 1993). Fehr and Schmidt (1999) assume that individuals are 
inequity-averse, but also that individuals would still rather have inequity in their favour 
than vice versa. In other words, there is a stronger aversion to unfavourable inequity 
(i.e. your payoff is higher than mine) than favourable inequity (i.e. my payoff is higher 
than yours). For our TSD group, subject behaviour is consistent with increased aversion 
to unfavourable inequity in the Ultimatum game compared with RW. That is, subjects 
were more willing to sacrifice personal monetary payoff and reject offers perceived as 
unfair. This increased tendency to reject Ultimatum offers is also present in those with 
ventromedial PFC damage (Koenigs and Tranel, 2007; see below). 
 
While decision-making is seen and measured typically as a rational cognitive process, 
emotional experiences play a key role in guiding that process (Camerer, 2003). A 
plausible hypothesis based on neural evidence is a dual system approach, whereby 
decisions within the Ultimatum game are guided by cognition and emotion. For our TSD 
group, participants were less willing to accept unfair offers, even though they generated 
a positive monetary payoff. When viewed from a cognitive perspective, this would 
appear to be a poor decision to reject money over perceived unfairness. Fairness 
concerns are, of course, important even in RW decisions, but our results indicate that 
decisions following TSD may be guided more by emotion than would otherwise be the 
case. The data presented here adhere to this dual-hypothesis approach. SD is known to 
disrupt PFC function (e.g. Chee and Chuah, 2008) and as such the contribution of the 
cognitively orientated DLPFC to the decision-making process is potentially 
compromised. As a result, the emotionally orientated contribution may become 
dominant in the decision-making process, which will lead in turn to an increased 
likelihood of rejecting an unfair offer. However, the extent to which this may be reflected 
in imaging data during TSD is unknown. Koenigs and Tranel (2007) examine Ultimatum 
game play in subjects with ventromedial PFC brain lesions, and find that such subjects 
reject Ultimatum offers with higher frequency, similarly to our TSD group. While it is well 
known that behaviours mediated by the PFC are affected by sleep loss (c.f. Horne, 
1993), the extent to which the cost of rejection is given less weight in the brain’s cost–
benefit analysis of the decision scenario (Fehr and Camerer, 2007), and whether the 
emotional reaction dominates the decision to reject unfair offers during TSD is unknown 
but warrants further research. While Knoch et al. (2006) show that disruption to the right 
DLPFC via repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) increases the likelihood 
of accepting unfair offers, the extent to which disruption of the PFC via rTMS acts as a 
robust model of sleep loss is unknown. However, the paper does support a fundamental 
role of emotion in decision-making which is currently unexamined in a sleep loss 
context. 
 
While we are not looking at emotion per se in our studies, the Ultimatum game does 
elicit an emotional response when playing against another person. Studies have shown 
repeatedly a stronger emotional reaction to unfair offers made by a person rather than 
by a computer (McCabe et al., 2001; Rilling et al., 2008; Sanfey et al., 2003; van’t Wout 
et al., 2006), resulting in an increased rejection of unfair offers. While we suggest that 
our findings may point to a potential conflict between emotive and cognitive processes, 
it is unknown whether rejections were made because of an overt emotional expression. 
However, while Pillutla and Murnighan (1996) suggested that anger was more likely to 
invoke a rejection of an unfair offer, Crockett et al. (2008) suggested that this was 
unrelated to mood. While our results may also be explained, in part, by inhibition, a 
known consequence of sleep loss (Drummond et al., 2006), we would expect inhibition 
to manifest itself by TSD subjects accepting or rejecting ‘all’ offers because of the 
inability to inhibit a reject/accept response for all options. This was not the case in our 
study. Moreover, SD-induced inhibition does not explain the altered response for the 
second mover in the Ultimatum game and the first mover in the Trust game. The only 
commonality these two decisions share is a risk of being taken advantage of. 
 
While the Ultimatum game is designed to assess decision-making with an emotive 
element (fair versus unfair decision), the findings here may also be attributable to 
decision-making per se, but in a social context. While we believe that the social 
component of this task influences the decision-making process, based on neural 
evidence from the literature for both Ultimatum games and sleep loss, one could assess 
this directly by repeating the experiment but controlling for decision-making under less 
social context with less emotive consequences, i.e. making a decision versus a 
computer. Nevertheless, if TSD affects decision-making per se (and the social context is 
a confound), again this would not explain the unusual result we find in that only 
responders in the Ultimatum game show TSD effects, but in the Trust game it is the first 
movers showing behavioural effects. Here, we find that extreme levels of trust among 
first movers in the Trust experiment are less likely following TSD. Second movers in the 
Trust game who still make a decision (how much money to pass back) are unaffected 
(they are not at risk at being taken advantage of), just as Ultimatum proposers are 
unaffected. 
 
The present evidence is thus consistent with the hypothesis that SD increases one’s 
aversion to unfavourable payoff inequity, as if one becomes more sensitized to the 
threat of being ‘outdone’ in the social interaction (although the threat may exist in some 
sense in the Dictator game, there is no response option). This threat may be more 
salient to an Ultimatum responder who can choose what level of payoff inequity he/she 
accepts, compared with the proposer who either gains more than half the pie (typically) 
or an equal-payoff outcome of zero in the event of rejection. On the contrary, in the trust 
environment, it becomes the first mover who faces the largest threat of being exploited. 
A second mover in the Trust experiment is less likely to feel exploited given that he/she 
can choose to always pass zero of whatever amount the first-mover trusts. Thus, it 
seems that the threat of exploitation looms largest for Ultimatum responders (second 
mover) and first-move trusters and, if TSD leads to a heightened fear of being taken 
advantage of, this may generate the data patterns we observe. 
 
Some related research on the Trust game may help to shed further light on our findings, 
hypothesis and interpretation. Subjects playing the same Trust game were infused 
intranasally with the synthetic neuropeptide oxytocin (OT) in the Kosfeld et al. (2005) 
and Baumgartner et al. (2008) studies. In both studies, the OT-infused subjects were 
more trusting than the control (placebo) group, even when their trust had been 
breached several times (i.e. post-feedback –Baumgartner et al., 2008). This finding is of 
particular interest not just because we administer the same Trust game, but primarily 
because OT has been shown to decrease amygdala activity (Kirsch et al., 2005). Under 
conditions of TSD (35 h), Yoo et al. (2007) reported that subjects displayed a larger 
amygdala response to emotive pictures than those viewing them well-rested. 
Furthermore, they also reported a decreased functional connectivity between the 
amygdala and the medial PFC following TSD. Despite coming from different tasks, 
these findings suggest that emotion-related centres (i.e. the amygdala) may be more 
dominant in the decision-making of TSD subjects resulting in less trusting behaviours. 
Together, these studies suggest that TSD would lead to less trusting social choices 
given that it enhances amygdala activity, which appears detrimental towards exhibition 
of trust. Insel and Young (2001) provide corroborative (animal) data showing that OT 
may reduce defensive behaviour (e.g. fear of betrayal reduced). Thus, the hypothesis 
that increased amygdala dominance in the social decision process will increase fear of 
betrayal and thereby lower trust is consistent with our evidence. While no study 
currently exists assessing TSD and neural responses to trust, our findings remain 
speculative, yet beckon future work on this research agenda. 
 
Our results suggest that individuals’ social preferences are more concerned with 
avoiding betrayal of different sorts following TSD, even by anonymous counterparts. In 
both simple bargaining and trust experiments, significant behavioural effects are found 
on only one side of the interaction, but in both environments the result is consistent with 
an increased defensiveness following TSD. If trust is an important component of a well-
functioning modern society, then reduction of trust in an increasingly sleep-deprived 
society holds significant implications. Indeed, many important institutions function on a 
certain level of trust (e.g. banks for solvency, informal credit markets, marriage). Clearly, 
the full cost of TSD effects on the quality of social interactions is beyond the scope of 
this study, but our results are suggestive of behaviours that have been unexamined in a 
TSD context. They indicate that mistrust and defensiveness may become more 
prevalent as our social preference decisions become more controlled by the emotional 
part of the brain that has heightened awareness of possible exploitation when under 
TSD. 
 
These experiments are a first step in examining social preferences (allocation of 
resources between self and others) and TSD. While our discussion is speculative, 
further research addressing neural correlates of behavioural responses to these 
economic decision-making games is key to enhancing our understanding of decision-
making under periods of sleep loss. Although our TSD results are consistent with those 
of frontal dysfunction, our findings were based on small sample sizes. Although we 
report statistical significance across the tasks on important outcome variables, further 
research may attempt to replicate our findings using a larger sample size to increase 
power, thus promoting less speculation on the results found, especially if coupled with 
imaging techniques. Nevertheless, this area of study is in its infancy and our results 
highlight the necessity to examine other aspects of SD beyond vigilance, attention, 
human–computer interactions, etc. to reflect real-world behaviours. Although real-world 
sleep loss may not be as extensive as 36 h [although medical residents work in excess 
of 30 h (e.g. Lockley et al., 2004) and, interestingly, have been reported to have 
amplified reactions to negative stimuli (Zohar et al., 2005)], further work may address 
the extent to which one must be sleep-deprived before such behavioural effects set in. 
Furthermore, we do not examine the importance of the actual face-to-face interaction 
present in real-world negotiations and many trust environments. Here, we do this 
explicitly in order to reduce the potential confounds of unquantifiable aspects of face-to-
face interactions (e.g. body language), yet recognize that these are clearly interesting 
components of real-world social interactions. In short, there is a wealth of important 
aspects of social interactions that remain unexplored by sleep researchers. 
Nevertheless, these experiments are a first step towards a more comprehensive 
examination of decision-making within a social domain, and are the first indicators that a 
rational decision may not prevail over more emotional options following one night of 
sleep loss. 
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